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Abstract This article explores the emergent public sphere in Egypt in the early 
1990s by analysing the debates about the ‘repentant’ artists. Many artists, mostly 
women but also a few men, stepped down from art for religious reasons. Some of 
them even started to preach against art because they considered their former 
profession haram. The ‘repentance’ of so many famous performers led to fierce 
contestations in the media. Art became an issue par excellence for debating notions 
of the ‘common good’ and the ‘good Muslim.’ Media were intensively used by 
secularists, conservative Muslims, Islamists, the regime and repentant artists to 
publicise their version of Islam. The different voices in the debate are analysed to 
investigate whether they constitute a counterpublic.
Keywords Islamic Revival. Repentance. Performing arts. Egypt. Gender
At the beginning of the 1990s, an incessant stream of ‘repentant’ artists1 struck 
Egypt like an earthquake. In the 1980s, a few artists had seen the light and publicly 
announced their stepping down from art: the actress Shams al-Barudi (1982), shortly 
followed by her husband Hasan Yusif, the dancer Hala al-Safi (1987), the singer 
Shadia (1987), the actress Hana' Tharwat and her husband Muhammad al-'Arabi 
(1987) and singer Yasmin al-Khiyyam (1989). But from the 1990s—with a peak in 
1992—the ‘caravan’ of stepped-down artists increased at a staggering speed: 
Shahira, 'Afaf Sho'ib and Madiha Hamdi veiled and retired, soon to be followed by 
Soheir al-Babli, Soheir Ramzi, Sawsan Badr, Farida Seif al-Nasr and many others. In 
1992, Egypt was struck by a natural earthquake as well. Yet, to suggest any 
relationship between the ‘repentance’ of artists and the earthquake is to take part in a
!Not all artists like the label repentance. For that reason, I have used inverted commas for ‘repented’ artists 
(fannanat ta ’ ibat). Other notions that are used as synonyms are stepped-down artists (fannanat mu ’tazilat) 
or veiled artists (fannanat muhagabat).
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heated debate about the reasons behind the stepping down of so many famous 
performers. The fierce disputes between secularists and Islamists about the ‘repentant’ 
artists will be central to this article.
The early 1990s, and particularly 1992, was a turbulent time in Egyptian history. 
Egypt was hit by a series of terrorist attacks, on Copts, policemen and foreign 
tourists. The writer Farag Fuda was assassinated in 1992. The regime began to hunt 
down ‘Islamists,’ ‘extremists’ and ‘terrorists’ and blurred distinctions between them. 
The battle between the regime and the extremists was not limited to the political and 
military field. In the socio-cultural sphere, confrontations were also taking place, 
ranging from the destruction of billboards advertising theatre plays to attacks on 
theatrical groups, performers and video shops (Ramzi 1994). As Zubaida noted, 
modern Islamism attempted to impose religious authority on culture and society, 
which meant a quest for ‘the moralisation of the public space, the imposition of ritual 
observance, and the censorship of cultural and entertainment products (Zubaida 
2002: 19). For the Islamic revival movement, in all its more and less militant facets, 
the creation of alternative Islamic forms of popular diversion and the development of 
forms of art and culture compatible with pious sensibilities was of crucial importance 
(Hirschkind 2006: 128).
Whereas the militant attacks could be discarded as ‘terrorist extremism,’ the 
general Islamic revivalist campaign for morality in society and art was less easily 
dismissed by opponents and the government. It is fed by a broad piety movement 
among the Egyptian population (Mahmood 2005). The Islamic trend was 
accordingly met with an ambivalent attitude by the regime. The government was 
trying to profile itself as more religious than the extremists (Tadros 1994). It was at 
the same time opposing and accommodating various strands of Islamists depending 
on shifting evaluations of the danger they were perceived to pose to the regime 
(Hirschkind 2006: 61-62). Within this tense climate, the repentance and veiling of 
many actresses, singers and dancers, high-profile media figures who set pious 
examples to their fans, proved to be a complex and sensitive issue. The repentant 
artists accordingly became objects of intense media debates. Conservative Muslims 
and Islamists capitalised on the repentance and veiling of artists to promote their 
views on morality in Egyptian society. Views that were contested by seculars and 
liberals were met with ambiguous responses by the regime.
The fierceness and multiplicity of voices in this debate can be analysed as an 
example of the ‘emergent public sphere.’ As Salvatore and Eickelman (2004) have 
argued, increasingly open discussions about issues related to the ‘common good’ are 
emerging in Muslim countries. Cassettes, sermons, books, including the increasing 
amount of religious booklets, videos, TV, radio and the Internet have led to a 
booming public sphere. Large numbers of people, and not just the elite, want a say in 
political and religious issues in the emergent public sphere. New leaders and 
spokespeople claim the right to speak in the political and religious arenas and 
disseminate their ideas through various media. The new public sphere is 
performative, that is, the media are not just conveying messages but are also part 
of the message, and participatory as well. Also, women and minorities find their way 
into the fields of political and religious discourse. New media seem to open 
possibilities for new people to express new ways of thinking (Eickelman and 
Anderson 1999).
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Salvatore and Eickelman (2004: xiii) note the paradox of modern Muslim 
societies, that although there is no singular public, but rather a multiplicity of 
overlapping forms of publics, the public good is increasingly defined within the 
parameters of Islam. For Egypt, the late preacher Sheikh al-Sha'arawi, and the ‘born- 
again’ scholar, Mustafa Mahmud, are particularly mentioned as important figures in 
the trend towards ‘the publicization of Islam’ in the early 1990s. Their proliferation 
in the form of cassettes, books and particularly TV programs are key tools for 
gaining dominance in public debates. They also happen to be important figures 
related to the repentance of artists.
Yet how far do these voices constitute a counterpublic (Fraser 1990), that is, an 
alternative public independent of the regime? Are these new voices, using new 
media, actually expressing new ways of thinking? Mona Abaza (2006: p. 58) 
answers these questions negatively for Mustafa Mahmud as well as al-Sha'arawi. 
She sees them as exponents of the petro-Islam and the growing Saudi-tisation of 
Egyptian society and as closely related to the regime. Also, Hirschkind (2006: 54) 
describes al-Sha'arawi as the government’s preacher used by the government against 
the more contestory parts of the Islamic movements. Sami Zubaida (2002:19) 
generally argues that the conservative Islamic attempts at imposing morality fit in 
well with the aim of authoritarian rulers. They have a common quest for ‘cultural 
nationalism’ that seeks the restoration of authenticity and the eradication of 
inauthentic cultures or products of ‘Western corruption. ’ This quest reinforces social 
control and authoritarian rule which is much favoured by the regimes in the region.
Apparently, the emergent public sphere does not automatically lead to the 
proliferation of liberal and democratic voices but can lead to the spread of all kinds 
of voices, including conservative, antidemocratic and authoritarian voices. Yet, do 
these gloomy views about the emergent public sphere in Egypt of the 1990s also 
hold true for the repentant artists? They clearly belong to the ‘new people’ who find 
their way into the arenas of political and religious discourse, profoundly using the 
media. Do they put forward new ways of thinking? What ideas about the ‘good 
Muslim’ and particularly the ‘good Muslim woman’ do they disseminate?
In this article, I try to unravel the different tales about why artists have stepped down, 
including the artists’ own stories. I will argue that the debates about and by the 
repentant artists are good examples of the emergent public sphere. First, art became an 
issue par excellence for debating notions of the ‘common good’ and the ‘good Muslim’. 
Second, the debates on the repentant artists highlight the intense use of media. The 
former performers are public figures, known to millions. They are tremendously 
influential whether in fashion or veiling to a wide and diverse public. Because of the 
‘dangerous’ mediatised publicisation of their version of Islam, it is fiercely countered in 
official media and supported in other media. Third, there is a divergence of voices 
consisting foremost of secularists, conservative Muslims, Islamists, the regime and 
repentant artists. For all the voices concerned, religion becomes the way of framing the 
discussions on art. Lastly, conservative voices dominate the discourses of the early 
nineties. Sheikh al-Sha'arawi and Mustafa Mahmud are, together with conservative 
preacher Dr. 'Omar 'Abd al-Kafi, influential figures in the repentance of artists. These 
conservatives are given media space by the government. Whereas the conservative 
voices can probably not be analysed as a counterpublic independent of the government, 
the case of the repentant artists is more ambiguous.
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The research of this article is based on archive material and interviews with 
stepped-down artists. I collected stories of 28 well-known singers, dancers, actors 
and actresses who stepped down and ‘repented’, and in some cases returned, 
including five men. I was able to have personal interviews with 15 of them. I also 
interviewed 5 unknown retired veiled female performers during fieldwork in 2005, 
2006 and 2008. The research project deals with several waves of repentance, veiling 
and stepping down as well as the eventual return of several artists between 1980 and 
2008. This paper will concentrate on the highpoint—the beginning of the 1990s— 
when the ‘caravan’ of stepping down turned into a musalsa, TV series, followed by 
millions (Ruz al-Yusif, 11-10-1993).2
First act: the veil and ‘repentance’ of artists
‘Your decision to step down has shaken the earth’. Thus Shahira, a former actress 
who stepped down and veiled in 1991, congratulated her friend 'Afaf Sho’ib 
(interview in Mawed, November 1992). Shahira became the unofficial spokeswoman 
for the repentant actresses and communicated the news to the media. 'Afaf and 
Shahira visited Sheikh Mitwalli al-Sha'arawi together with their friend and former 
singer Yasmin al-Khiyyam who retired in 1990. They also followed the religious 
lessons organised by Yasmin al-Khiyyam in her mosque named after her late father, 
Sheikh al-Hosari. In addition, they followed religious lessons given by another 
former actress who turned into a preacher, Hana' Tharwat. The latter retired and took 
the niqab in 1987. Furthermore, the lessons of Mustafa Mahmud were very popular 
among the growing group of stepped-down artists. The number of actresses, singers 
and dancers stepping down and repenting gained a critical mass in the early 1990s. 
They organised themselves, became more visible and triggered more and more 
comments.
During the interviews I conducted with 'Afaf Sho'ib in 2005, she stressed the fact 
that she stepped down and veiled three days before the earthquake of October 1992. 
Influential in her religious turning was her eldest brother’s death in 1988. He phoned 
her at 10 o’clock in the evening and told her he anticipated his death. She did not 
believe him as he was healthy ‘like jasmine.’ At 3 o’clock, however, her other 
brother called and told her he had actually died. She suddenly realised the volatility 
of life and felt God wanted something of her. She travelled to the United States for 
the treatment of her sick mother and considered cosmetic surgery for herself. Her 
relatives discouraged her and she decided to do a isthikhara prayer, a special prayer 
to seek God’s advice, in this case whether to do the surgery or not. She then received 
a vision in which her deceased brother told her that life is trivial and a huge theatre 
in which people cheat on each other. ‘Reality starts after death in the afterlife, in 
paradise or hell’, he warned her. She decided against the operation and returned to 
Egypt. More and more she felt she should withdraw from acting. She followed 
religious lessons and met with repentant artists. After such a meeting on Friday, she 
prayed, read Qur'an and opened the Qur'an three times on arbitrary pages. The
2 For the first stage, see van Nieuwkerk (2008); presently I am working on the third stage in which artists 
have returned to the screen or stage and try to make pious productions.
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messages ‘struck her being and quaked her soul’ (interview in al-Nur, 21-10-1992). 
She then asked God in a supplicatory prayer to guide her in veiling. After that, she 
felt hypnotised and moved beyond her willpower to her cupboard and put on the 
hijab. 'Afaf also had several other spiritual experiences. In one of her visions, she 
foresaw scenes she witnessed during the earthquake a few days later.3 Such spiritual 
moments and visions did not only figure in 'Afaf’s story but abounded in several 
stories of repentant artists (van Nieuwkerk 2008).
After her retirement, she dedicated her time to charity, particularly during the 
aftermath of the earthquake, and Islamic da'wah. She prided herself in having 
converted several Christians from the West and reverted many Muslims, including 
three female artists. She sincerely hoped I would be ‘guided’ as well, or at least leave 
her house veiled. She made considerable missionary efforts during the interview. The 
fact that I was not a Muslim (yet) should not impart my taking the veil. She called 
me later that evening to tell me that Mary/Miriam was veiled as well. It was an 
interesting experience to undergo the strength of her da 'wah. She did not label 
herself a preacher, but as a former actress she was used to conveying messages 
convincingly. Like other repentant artists, she passionately promoted veiling among 
all women. She did not declare the performing arts totally haram but considered it 
haram for women, at least according to the 1992 interview in al-Nur. During the 
interview with me in 2005, she had returned as a veiled actress. She explained that 
she was very spiritual at the time of her stepping down, and wanted to use her time 
in a way that directly pleased God. Besides, there were hardly any roles for veiled 
actresses at the time because the government banned all veils from the screen. 
Moreover, she was used to constantly changing her acting roles and was afraid she 
would stray from the right—veiled—path.
Soheir al-Babli was a comedienne and retired shortly after 'Afaf Sho'ib. When I 
interviewed her in 2006, she had returned to acting and was in the middle of a new 
production. She thus discussed her reasons for returning in more detail than her 
former reasons for stepping down. Yet she affirmed the information from interviews 
in the early 1990s in general outlines. She was in a break in the performance of the 
play directed by the famous director, Galal Sharqawi, when she decided to quit. She 
related the events that led to her stepping down in a rather funny way.4 The last nine 
years before stepping down she went to Mecca to do the 'umrah with her friend, the 
actress Yusra. She veiled during the umrah and unveiled afterwards. If people asked 
her whether she ‘repented’ she used to laugh at them and retorted: ‘Repent from 
what? Did you repent from watching me?’! The last year, she was tired of 
performing the same theatre play as the two preceding seasons. During the umrah, 
she did several du'a’s to ask God to provide her with a pious husband, to show her 
the way and to forgive her sins (see also interview in al-Musawwar, 27-8-1993). She 
was not used to praying regularly but now felt like praying and reading Qur'an. The 
people around her asked her: ‘Ooh, you are not going to veil are you?’ ‘No, no’, she 
replied, ‘bi 'id 'anni il-hagat di’’ (far from me these kind of things).
3 Serial made in Saudi-Arabia on ‘repentant’ artists, ‘Those who are guided’/’Elazee ahtado’ (Sana 
Production Company, n.d.).
4 Video recording of her talk at the 22nd Annual National Convention, Los Angelos. ‘From Heart to 
Heart.’ Around 1999.
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Yet six months later she veiled. She related concerning this intermediate period 
that she returned to her villa in Alexandria and supervised repairs being done to her 
house. It was done by a certain Mahmud, a pious person, who to her great 
astonishment did not accept ba'shish or advance payment. Mahmud and his workers 
prayed during work, which initially made her afraid that the sensationalist press 
would describe the row of praying and Islamically-dressed workers under the 
headline: ‘a group of terrorists in Soheir al-Babli ’ s villa ’. Mahmud always averted 
his eyes from Soheir, a very strange experience for a famous actress, and urged her 
to dress up while his workers were around. She asked him about religion, started 
reading and slowly changed her appearance. She realised how little she knew about 
her religion. This situation continued until the rehearsal for the play with Galal 
Sharqawi started again and she had to return to Cairo. She travelled with her 
daughter—who veiled two years before her—and woke up for the fajr-prayer, which 
was very unusual for her. She did a du'a and slept as a baby whereas she usually 
needed sleeping pills.
She went to a ‘famous doctor’ , who was probably Dr. 'Omar 'Abd al-Kafi 
because during other interviews she named his fatwas (Ruz al-Yusif, 14-10-2005). 
She asked him about the permissibility of her work. He told her straight that it was 
haram. She replied: ‘thank you ’ and returned home (interview in Tawabon, 26-11­
2005). While waiting for someone to bring her the script, she asked her daughter to 
give her a veil. She felt the theatre was like a devil pulling her towards him. She 
restlessly put the tarha on and watched herself in the mirror without make up and 
with a veil. She then phoned Shahira, who usually conveyed the news of the 
repentance of artists to the media, and asked to make her veiling public. The 
publicisation of her veiling would prevent her relapsing into the old pattern. She 
broke the contract with Galal Sharqawi and gave him the money back. In the end, 
she married Mahmud and had her honeymoon in Mecca and Medina. She opened a 
business in Islamic fashion and ten years later returned as a veiled actress.
Soheir al-Babli quit the play titled ‘ Atiyya, the terrorist’ , ’ a play Galal Sharqawi 
had just rewritten to include hints of the terrorist attacks at that time. With so many 
artists stepping down and Soheir al-Babli on top of that, a limit was reached. When 
the play resumed its second season, with Galal ’s daughter 'Abir Sharqawi as the 
leading actress, the cream of the artists ’ world showed up. They wanted to 
demonstrate their support for the play and their dismay at the ‘fundamentalist turn 
of so many artists (Brooks 1998: 241-242).
Second act: earthquake and payment
The secular press and general public responded to the growing amount of repentant 
artists in several ways. Firstly, the general public and adversaries reacted with jokes, 
pestering and debunking remarks. Cynical jokes like the following were told among 
the Egyptian populace: ‘Who are the second best paid women in Egypt? Belly dancers 
of course, because Saudi tourists throw banknotes of hundred dollars at their feet while 
they are dancing. Who are the best-paid women in Egypt? The converted belly dancers 
of course, because Saudi sheikhs transfer banknotes of thousand dollars to their 
accounts if they stop dancing ’ (Brooks 1998: 242). The repentant artists were accused
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of being only interested in money, before and after ‘conversion ’ . It was added that 
the repentant stars were anyhow becoming older and that this was the way to make a 
last big haul (Brooks 1998: 242-243). Shams al-Barudi was faced with repeated 
showings of her old seductive films, particularly the film produced in 1973 by Abu 
Saif ‘Hamam al-Malitili ’ (The Malatili Bath) in which she appeared in a bathing suit. 
The films were said to be a greater success than at the time of their first release (Ruz 
al-Yusif, 7-3-1988). The movie critic, Kamal Ramzi (1994), wrote that it was easy to 
explain the phenomenon of retirement. Hala al-Safi had turned from a quick moving 
dancer into a heavy and slow performer, and her colleague Sahar Hamdi had ever 
mounting problems with the vice police. Soheir al-Babli should have retired long 
ago as she was approaching sixty. The journalist Ibrahim 'Issa (1993: 86-90) 
commented on the stepping down of Shams al-Barudi, Hana' Tharwat, Nisrin, 
Shahira and Soheir Ramzi that they were mediocre actresses anyhow and that no one 
would miss them. He suggested that stepping down was an ingenious way to remain 
in the spotlights despite lack of success as an actress. These reactions confirmed the 
general image of artists as greedy for money and attention. The adversaries stressed 
the artists material desires and bypassed their spiritual accounts.
A second reaction by journalists, commentators and performing artists emphasised 
the personal circumstances and the earthquake as reasons behind their repentance. The 
religious turn of Hala Fou'ad, Shahira and Shadia was related to their illnesses. 
The authors of Repentant Artists and the Sex Stars, who were sympathetic to the 
repentance of artists, claimed that they were even offered money in case they would 
write that veiling and stepping down by artists was only due to illness (Nasif and 
Khodayr 1993: 170). Opponents related the repentance of 'Afaf Sho'ib, Soheir 
al-Babli, Sahar Hamdi, Farida Seif al-Nasr and Soheir Ramzi to the earthquake and 
the fear of the Day of Judgement. The Islamist protagonists reacted angrily to this 
allegation because they interpreted this reasoning as ‘diminishing the greatness of 
God ’ s Guidance ’ (Kamil 1993: 23). Most actresses I interviewed who stepped down 
shortly after the earthquake denied any connection between the two phenomena. 
'Afaf Sho'ib, however, connected the earthquake with repentance in the case of all 
other actresses except for herself. She stepped down three days before the 
earthquake, a fact she repeatedly stressed. She interpreted this as personal guidance 
by God, unlike the more general ‘wrath of God and His call upon mankind to 
repent ’ , the significance many people attached to the earthquake. Only one former 
folklore dancer I interviewed said that the earthquake was the main reason to stop. 
She was scared to death by the earthquake and felt it was God s punishment. She 
perceived her work as haram and immediately quit and veiled after the earthquake. 
She expressed her gratitude to be ‘guided ’ by God: she had not died as a sinful 
dancer but received a chance to start a brand new life.
In these debates and reactions, the repentant artists were neither blamed, criticised 
nor ridiculed but their stories were treated as personal matters. The details of their 
visions might be questioned as very coincidental, but generally the personal freedom 
of anyone was stressed to either step down or veil or to keep on working. Several 
performing artists I interviewed took this approach. What they detested, however, 
was the label repentant artist. By using the term ‘repentance , a general claim was 
made that art is haram. This position was unacceptable to those working in the art 
scene. If there was a reason to repent it might be because some of these actresses,
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singers and dancers lived a dissolute life and not because working in the field of art 
in itself made repentance necessary (Nasif and Khodayr 1993: 131-144).
In a third response, several opponents drew attention to the dangerous political 
and religious aspects of the phenomenon of the veiled actresses. A straightforward 
connection was made between extremism or fundamentalism and the repentant 
artists. Two different relations between the phenomenon and fundamentalism were 
postulated: fear of extremist attacks and payment to veil and step down. At the 
beginning of the 1990s, a number of intellectuals and journalists were attacked, and 
artists could be the next targets. The singer Yasmin al-Khiyyam, daughter of the 
famous Qur'an reciter Sheikh al-Hosari, was threatened. Extremists urged her father 
to pray in front of the ka'ba and ask God to take away his daughter; or at least her 
voice. They also threatened to throw acid in her face (Nasif and Khodayr 1993: 98). 
Farida Seif al-Nasr—who retreated and later returned to show business—was 
attacked upon her return (Ruz al-Yusif, 2-8-1993). Hala al-Safi recounted a dream in 
which she passed a mosque and was frightened because she was not properly 
dressed. Suddenly a man, who was later identified as the Prophet, appeared in her 
dream and covered her. The psychiatrist, novelist and feminist, Nawal al-Sa'adawi, 
concluded that one need not be a psychiatrist to interpret this dream as a reaction 
against pressure by religious extremists (Brooks 1998: 244).
Yet the most common and enduring accusation or rumour was the payment of 
artists to step down and veil. It was already rumoured in the late 1980s that groups 
paid artists if they veiled and stepped down. I remember Nadia, a dancer whom I met 
in 1987 in the Cairene street of popular artists, Muhammad 'Ali Street. She was 
originally from Alexandria and divorced twice. In order to provide for her kids, 
whom she left with her mother in Alexandria, she worked at weddings and in 
cheaper nightclubs. Nadia heard the rumours of payment and was eagerly awaiting 
the offer of ‘repentance in exchange for money ’ . Unfortunately, she could not find 
those groups and had to keep on working. In the early 1990s, the rumours were 
strengthened by TV presenters and actresses who maintained that they were actually 
offered money to step down; an offer which they, of course, refused. Fatin Hamama 
and Nagwa Ibrahim claimed payment as well as Elham Shahin (Ruz al- Yusif 11-10­
1993). Fatin Hamama was allegedly offered 7 million pounds (Kamil 1993: 21). 
Nagwa Ibrahim claimed she would receive 1 million dollars and a monthly salary of 
150,000 dollars (idem: 31). Elham Shahin said she received a phone call that 
informed her that she would be paid a million dollars for stepping down and veiling. 
This rich person had his channels through the repentant artists as well as journalists 
from the religious press to check her actual veiling and stepping down. The payment 
was scaled according to talents and stardom, and only Elham, Yusra and Lela 'Ilwa 
would receive a million dollars. This might explain the bad luck of Muhammed Ali 
Street dancer Nadia. There was also the case of an Egyptian art director, making the 
accusations more complex. He recorded his story of repentance on five tapes and 
turned into a preacher against art. He was later ‘disguised as a failed student and a 
tool at the hand of ‘professional traders of extremism who paid Egyptian actresses 
to ‘finish them (Ramzi 1994). These rumours and accusations were very difficult to 
ascertain and were denied by the stepped-down actresses.
More subtle accusations by journalists of payments were the allegations of rich oil 
sheikhs marrying the Egyptian actresses. The sheikhs allegedly forced them to veil
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and to step down from acting and then shortly after divorced them in order to marry 
the next actress. Money invested by a Saudi company in order to produce a 
videocassette about the repentance of artists was said to be used to spread the 
Wahhabi version of Islam throughout the Middle East ('Issa 1993: 35). Shams al­
Barudi allegedly received financial assistance to buy her old seductive films in order 
to take them out of circulation. Soheir Ramzi and Shams al-Barudi were invited to 
tell their stories of guidance in Jeddah and were said to be amply remunerated (Ruz 
al-Yusif, 3-5-1993). The veiled artists were accused of being actively used by outside 
forces, to wit Saudi Arabia, to spread their ‘Bedouin, desert version of Islam ’ ('Issa 
1993: 77-79).
Particularly in the book al-Harb bi al-Niqab, the last-mentioned author made a 
strong argument to analyse the emergent hijab and niqab phenomenon among 
Egyptian women as a Saudi-tisation of Egypt. The migration of many Egyptians and 
their yearlong submergence in the Saudi way of life and thinking made many 
Egyptians susceptible to Salafi extremism. Saudi-influenced preachers such as 
Sheikh Mitwalli al-Sha'arawi and Dr. 'Omar 'Abd al-Kafi, the two sheikhs most 
influential on repentant artists, rose to stardom through their mediatised appearances 
and their connections with artists. Their influence on artists catapulted their own 
fame and spread their Salafi ideology, according to Ibrahim 'Issa. The same author 
also launched a massive anti-Dr. 'Omar 'Abd al-Kafi campaign in the weekly 
magazine Ruz al-Yusif in 1993. He argued that the preaching of Sheikh al-Sha'arawi 
and Dr. 'Omar 'Abd al-Kafi was destroying the Egyptian art production—the basis 
of Egypt s central position in the region and an important source of income. Besides, 
he accused them ofpreaching against the freedom ofwomen ('Issa 1993: 77-79). He 
feared the fundamentalist or Saudi campaigns to veil artists and let them stay at 
home was a way of sending women back to ‘ages of oppression ’ .
The secularist discourse against the repentant artists invoked nationalist deliber­
ations. Egypt and its national heritage should be safeguarded from foreign or false 
influences. The cultural nationalist discourse put forward by Ibrahim 'Issa and others 
warned against the inauthenticity of ‘petro-dollar ’ preachers and the veiled artists. 
They pointed to the danger of the Saudi-tisation of Egypt and the loss of the 
cornerstones of Egypt ’ s civilization, particularly its art. Cultural and national identities 
are often expressed through gender symbolism. The call upon female performers to 
veil and return to the house were thus not only seen as inauthentic ideas on art and 
religion but also on gender. The ideas on art and gender promoted by means of 
Egyptian penitents themselves were seen as particularly powerful tools in the 
Saudi-tisation of Egypt. They were not only perceived as pawns of extremist Islamists 
but also as active missionaries of fundamentalist discourses on gender and art.
Third act: the Islamist press strikes back
The Islamist press came to the aid of the veiled actresses. This was partly due to the 
ex-performers themselves. They chose the Islamist press to tell their stories. Shams 
al-Barudi narrated ‘her journey from darkness to the light ’ to the Islamic newspaper 
al-Nur (10-2-1988). Also, 'Afaf Sho'ib preferred to tell her story to al-Nur because 
she trusted this Islamic magazine (12-10-1992). This did not necessarily mean
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though that the way they were portrayed in the Islamist booklets bore the approval of 
all veiled artists. The Islamist press consistently depicted the artists as sinners who 
returned to ‘the right fold . It attached the strong label of repentance to the veiled 
actresses, a label disliked by some of them. The Islamist authors enforced the idea of 
artists as sinners and non-believers as opposed to repentant artists who saw the light 
and became true believers. Not all stepped-down artists were comfortable with such 
a mono-dimensional view of their life stories.
The Islamist press warmly embraced and circulated the stories of the repentant 
artists. They promoted the genre of the repentance literature, a genre that thrived in 
the early 1990s. The proliferation of booklets with such titles as The tears o f  the 
penitents was probably related to the earthquake because this was perceived to have 
awakened people ’s awareness of God ’s wrath. The ex-performers ’ narratives were 
sources of inspiration for other sinners stories of remorse and became like a script. I 
collected several booklets in which the stories of artists are reprinted. Some books 
are exclusively focussed on artists, in others their stories are printed amidst those of 
diverse ‘repentant sinners such as burglars, and even with narratives of Western 
converts. The mixture is interesting because it equals the guidance of a Muslim 
sinner to that of a non-Muslim. These stories also widely circulate on the Internet. 
About 40 websites disseminate the interviews of 'Amal Khodayr with ten ‘repentant 
artists ’ under the title My journey to the world o f  Faith.5 Like conversion stories, the 
narratives of repentant artists are part of a worldwide da'wah strategy (van 
Nieuwkerk 2006).
In the genre of the repentance literature, the depth and sincerity of the artists 
remorse, and particularly the divine nature of their guidance, was detailed. It was 
presented as the work of God since He chooses whom to guide and at which 
moments—whether before or after the earthquake, during the pilgrimage or after 
dancing and drinking in a nightclub. It was felt that linking their spiritual turn to 
illness or the earthquake obscured the direct hand of God in the artists guidance to 
the right path. For that reason, the visions and moments of spiritual illumination 
were spelled out in the Islamist press. Several artists, such as Hala al-Safi, Shams 
al-Barudi and 'Afaf Sho'ib, narrated their dreams, visions and spiritual moments. 
This pertained to dreams of deceased relatives, the vision of the prophet, the 
expulsion of the devil and several spiritual experiences during the pilgrimage. It also 
included descriptions where they felt unable to control their own movements and 
utterances, such as prayers coming forth without their control or leaving them 
speechless. Also, being unconscious, hypnotised or in trance were all mental states 
that pointed at an outside force directing them (van Nieuwkerk 2008).
For the Islamist press and supportive sheikhs such as al-Sha'arawi and Dr. 'Omar 
'Abd al-Kafi, the repentant artists could only be new models for pious womanhood 
if they were totally clean. This meant a moral, mental and material break with their 
pasts. This raised the issue as to what stepped-down artists should do with the 
savings from their ‘sinful profession ; for, surely, they could not happily live their 
lives of remorse from the ‘sinful money. ’ They were not even allowed to use it for 
charity, as the money is haram and God receives only money from a halal source.
5 For instance, Islamna, accessed on January 2004.
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Several stepped-down artists asked al-Sha'arawi ’ s advice. During the interview, Hala 
al-Safi explained to me that Sheikh al-Sha'arawi advised her to invest her money in 
a morally good project. The money she would gain from this project would be halal 
and she could live off it. She opened an Islamic school.
In accordance with the Islamist representation of the ‘return of artists to the right 
fold ’ as divinely inspired and beyond doubt, the accusation of payment was depicted 
as totally false. It proved, however, difficult to counter the accusations of payment 
except for general statements that guidance is from God and is priceless. The limits 
of ‘ obscenity and debasement were reached for the Islamist author, Magdi Kamil, 
when the accusation of money paid for divine guidance was launched in the secular 
press. He felt the need to defend the artists from this immoral campaign which put 
their true belief in Islam in doubt. He claimed that the campaign was the work of the 
enemies of Islam: that is, journalists who thrived on artists scandals and 
degeneration and feared for their income if the caravan of repentant artists would 
grow (Kamil 1993: 18-19). In his portraits of the artists, he contrasted the former 
‘dissolute lifestyle with the ‘total harmony and devotion of the ex-performers 
present life. Art was deemed to debase women s virtue and the return to the home 
was presented as a bliss (idem: 21). The Islamist press thus used the smearing 
campaign against repentant artists to slander the scene of art. They defamed the art 
scene as a corrupt field, particularly for women. They reversed the argument and 
suggested that it would be good if money could be paid for repentance instead of 
sinning. Particularly, Sheikh Mitwalli al-Sha'arawi was quoted as saying ‘if we find 
someone who wants to pay for divine guidance as others pay for digression, we will 
thank God ’ ('Issa 1993: 76).
The ex-performers became powerful new models for pious women. Female artists 
who veiled and left art for the home were perfect tools for reaching the masses with 
a message of veiling and domesticity. Sheikh al-Sha'arawi and Dr. 'Omar 'Abd al- 
Kafi were known for their conservative views on women and their great stress on 
domesticity (Abu Lughod 1998; Hatem 1998). They were influential in forging new 
ideals for Muslim women, images which were powerfully embodied and mediatized 
by the repentant artists. The Islamist press claimed that it was precisely this Islamic 
role model for women and the family that the secular press feared most. One author, 
Yasir Farhat (1993), working for the international association for da'wah and media, 
devoted his book to the ‘huge complot going on to destabilise the Muslim Family. 
He turned the accusations of payment upside down and claimed that the ‘enemies of 
Islam ’—the West, Jews, the secularists—paid for slandering repentant artists and 
made them stay in art. These ‘ enemies of Islam knew the importance of women, 
their virtue and the stability of the family for the Islamic faith. If this pillar were 
destroyed, Islam would be smashed. They wanted the Muslim women, seen as 
‘vulnerable and easily influenced , to leave the home, reveal themselves and work in 
such disreputable fields as art.
The Islamist press thus also invoked a discourse of ‘cultural nationalism . In their 
version, however, the source of inauthenticity is not Saudi Arabia, but the West, 
Jews and the enemy from within, the secularists. Besides the competing views on 
religion and art, there were rivalling views on gender. The conservatives and 
Islamists projected an image of the ‘good pious woman ’ who veiled, stayed at home 
and provided care for her house, husband and children. Work outside the home in
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general, but in disreputable fields like art in particular, were singled out as un- 
Islamic. Paid labour in the name of freedom, liberating women by unveiling and 
leaving the house were seen as the views of ‘the enemies of Islam ’ . The female 
performer and Muslim woman were depicted as diametrically opposed to each other. 
The veiled ex-performers bridged the antithesis through their repentance.
Entre act: government control and conservative morality
The Islamist campaign against art not only used the written stories of repentant 
artists but also other media. Sheikh Mitwalli al-Sha'arawi promoted the repentance 
of artists through his TV programs. Dr. 'Omar 'Abd al-Kafi produced about 90 tapes 
in this period mostly dealing with the Day of Judgement. A production company 
from the Gulf produced a series on ‘those who are guided. ’ 'Afaf Sho'ib was the first 
to tell her story. Yet it was banned by the Egyptian censor, Abu Shadi, because he 
considered it insulting to the performing artists (al-Kawakeb, 17-2-1998). The 
authors of The Repentant Artists and the Sex Stars claimed that advertising for the 
book was refused by Egyptian censorship (Nasif and Khodayr 1993: 15).
This brings us to the ambiguous role of the government which tried to restrict the 
dissemination of Islamist views, but had a confusing and shifting policy. On the one 
hand, the regime tried to project a modern image and was officially secular. On the 
other hand, it perceived itself as the moral guardian of the values of society and 
religion and tried to prove itself more religious than the ‘fundamentalists ’ (Tadros
1994). It tried to encompass the moderate forms of the Islamic revival movement but 
to undermine the militant or oppositional strands. There was therefore difficulty in 
drawing clear-cut boundaries between the state and a ‘counterpublic ’ .6 Not only 
conservatives and some strands of the Islamic revival were entangled with the 
regime, as this also held true for the secular cultural field. Hirschkind (2006) warns 
against analysing the state as a single entity. It is not a monolithic bloc but comprises 
of several agents, institutions and individuals influenced by the Islamic revival 
movement.
As Samia Mehrez (2001) and Jessica Winegar (2006) argue, the regime and the 
secular cultural field are closely related. The state has produced modern cultural 
institutions. These institutions are dependent on the government for their 
effectiveness and have become the protégé of the state. Yet, the state also depends 
on the cultural players to articulate its semblance of modernity to the world (Mehrez 
2001: 10-15). This does not preclude criticism by secular artists, producers and 
journalists on the regime, yet they collide in their defence against an ‘Islamisation of 
the cultural sphere . The interdependency between the state and the cultural field 
makes it likely to assume that the above-mentioned campaigns against Islamists and 
the repentant artists were approved by the state.
6 Hirschkind (2006: 106, 232) does not use the notion counterpublic in the sense of Fraser (1990), that is 
referring to the discursive arenas of subordinate and oppositional groups, but uses it to distinguish the 
different sensorium underlying the discursive practices of the contestory movement from the liberal- 
democratic understandings. In this section, I will follow Fraser s original use of the term counterpublic and 
come back to Hirschkind in the epilogue.
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One obvious example of the state s ‘ modernity policy was banning the veil. 
During the period of armed conflict with militant Islamists, the government began to 
see the Islamic dress as a political symbol and a threat. Veiled women were banned 
from the media as well as from the state and private educational institutions. The 
policy was eventually concretised in the controversial Unification of School Uniform 
Order in 1994 that forbade schoolgirls from wearing hijab (Herrara 2001: 16-19). 
Several stepped-down artists were forced to retire because the regime did not allow 
them to work as veiled actresses or TV presenters. Kamilia al-'Arabi for instance 
wanted to resume her work as a TV presenter of a religious program but was mocked 
and fired (Hiwar, 6-9-2001). So the anti-veil policy of the regime hindered the return 
of the stepped-down actresses in the early 1990s. Those who wanted to work as 
veiled actresses were forced to work for foreign, Saudi, channels or productions 
aimed at that market (Tartoussieh 2007). One of the few examples of a veiled TV 
presenter was the hostess Kariman Hamza (Malti-Douglas 2001). She was allowed 
to present a religious program during Ramadan 1993 in which she invited Dr. 'Omar 
'Abd al-Kafi to explain his conservative views. Also, Mustafa Mahmud and Sheikh 
Mitwalli al-Sha'arawi were given ample media space in the 1980s to spread their 
brand of Islamic thought.
Hirschkind (2006) noted the shifting policies of the state towards the diverse 
strands of the Islamic revival movement. He distinguished official khutaba 
preachers, promoted by the state, from the non-official or oppositional da'iyat 
preacher belonging to the Islamic Revival movements. But he also acknowledged 
that several preachers of the ‘counterpublic such as Kishk also preached at state 
mosques. The government tried to exercise increasing control over mosques and 
sermons. Through the institution of da'wah institutes, certifying future preachers, 
they also tried to influence the Islamic discourse. Sheikh al-Sha'arawi was critical of 
the government but was allowed to voice his opinion from within the state s 
institutions. Dr. 'Omar 'Abd al-Kafi was initially allowed to appear on TV until he 
was muzzled because his preaching was considered to be too militant. His tapes 
were, however, broadly consumed in the contestory Islamic revival movement. 
Depending on the states appraisal of the danger of individual preachers, they were 
allowed media space or were banned and forced to use the less controlled public 
sphere of tapes.
The amount of religious programming was generally expanding during this 
period. Besides outlawing criticism of religion and erosion of national unity, many 
stipulations of the latest 1976 censorship law were connected to morality, such as 
forbidding justification of immoral actions, images of naked bodies, emphasis on 
erotic parts, sexually arousing scenes and disrespect for the sanctity of family values 
(Shafik 2001a). Arising from the dependency of the cultural field on the state, self 
censorship was strong. Besides, as Abu Shadi (1994), the current artistic censor, 
noted, during the 1980s and early 1990s the censors were Islamic conservatives 
themselves. ‘Extremist religious ’ influences had been allowed to infiltrate television 
programs and artistic compositions. Coupled with the growing influence and space 
allowed to censorship by al-Azhar—leading to the statement that al-Azhar is the 
authority to which the Ministry of Culture must approve licenses for films, books 
and tapes that discuss religion—the twisted position of the regime became clear 
(Abu Shadi 1994; Engel 2004).
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Another factor conducive for the morally conservative programming was the 
influence of Saudi Arabia on the cultural field in Egypt. The investments of money 
from Saudi Arabia in the Egyptian art industry led to censorship and production in 
accordance with Wahhabi Islam (Ramzi 1994). Since movie theatres were not 
allowed in Saudi Arabia, it was particularly with the introduction of the VCR that a 
market for home videos was opened up. The Gulf States became the main customers 
during this period and were thus able to enforce their censorship regulations. With 
the petrodollars, prudishness moved in, as Viola Shafik (2001b) aptly remarked. It is 
only after the mid-1990s that the government and the cultural field started to use the 
media to discredit ‘fundamentalists . They even used the genre of repentance 
narratives by broadcasting a ‘repentant extremist’ who turned to the ‘right ’—in the 
view of the regime—religious fold on TV.
Fourth act: ambivalent responses by stepped-down actresses
Islamists harshly judged the artists past and depicted them as sinners. Only by being 
born again could they start pious and clean lives as wives and mothers. Some 
repentant artists shared this view, others had more nuanced views on their past 
activities and art in general. The fierce attacks by the secular press drove them into 
the arms of the Islamist press. The Islamist embrace was comforting but perhaps too 
warm and eager. The responses of the ‘repentant artists ’ to the commotion they have 
caused were diverse.
Shams al-Barudi was harassed by the continuous programming of her old films. 
She eventually felt forced to publish an announcement in several newspapers 
because she feared people might think that she resumed acting. She declared that she 
stepped down from art since February 1982 and that they were showing old films 
(Ittahad, 8-8-1985). All ex-performers reacted vehemently against the accusations of 
payment. They mentioned several arguments as to why it was illogical to assume 
payment for veiling. If artists were after money they would have kept on working. 
Besides, as they earned a huge amount of money as artists, who could pay such a 
high salary for many years to so many artists? And what about all other veiled 
women, the doctors, engineers, teachers, medical doctors? Were they all paid for 
veiling, they rhetorically asked. Dancer Hala al-Safi snapped that no one would ever 
pay for veiling, only for revealing. Other actresses reversed the argument and 
mentioned that they were offered money for resuming acting and unveiling. In a 
collective letter, they stressed that they left the thousands and millions of pounds 
while they were still in their youth. They left the life of beauty and cheap enjoyments 
to devote themselves to God and paradise. They wished the slanderous press the 
same divine guidance as had befallen them (Kolenas, 9-9-1992).
They were particularly stung by Nagwa Ibrahim ’s story of groups paying large 
amounts of money and sent an open letter to several newspapers. Signed by 12 
stepped-down artists they wrote a statement that if it was really true that groups 
secretly paid money, it was a dangerous development for the nation. It was therefore 
Nagwa Ibrahim s duty as a citizen to protect the country and to bring forth the names 
of those who offered payment (Mawed, 1-10-1992). The names were never released. 
They thus played the card of vigilant citizens. In individual reactions, they
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particularly emphasised that God ’s guidance had no equivalence in money and that 
no material gain was comparable to the ‘taste of the sweetness of faith and 
obedience .
The stepped-down artists thus rubbed along with the Islamic press. Yet not all of 
them had such gloomy views about their past activities and about art in general. 
Especially in response to the secularist press discrediting of their talents, they felt 
challenged to claim their successful careers. This claim was ill at ease with the 
concept of repentance. The complexity of their positioning between the secularist 
debunking of their talents and the Islamist discourse of repentance was revealed to 
me during an interview with Hala al-Safi. I expected it would be difficult to touch on 
her former work as a dancer in nightclubs. Yet without hesitation she told me about 
the novelty of her former shows and the high level of her art. She described herself 
as an ambassador for Egypt as she used to be invited to perform at many parties 
outside Egypt. At the end of the interview in which she recounted her vision of the 
prophet who covered her nakedness, I asked if she had only a feeling of regret about 
her work or was also proud about her past performances. She then answered that 
regret was a necessary part of repentance and that of course she could not be proud 
about her past as this would question her sincere remorse.
Several artists thus felt insulted by the suggestion that they were less in demand, 
of mediocre level and growing old, and accordingly stressed their youth and talents. 
For most of them, this heightened the extent of God ’ s guidance. If you could leave 
stardom, wealth and the spotlights for God, something very forceful must have 
happened in your life. Whereas most emphasised divine guidance as central in their 
story, not all used repentance as a concept to describe their religious turn. Divine 
guidance was not necessarily linked to ‘repentance . Several positions were 
discernable towards the notion of ‘toba’ , ‘repentance ’. Some of them, like Hala 
al-Safi and Shams al-Barudi, used the concept to signal a total break with the life 
before. Art was likened to the devil which was removed from their lives. Hala 
al-Safi ’ s exclamation ‘the devil has stolen my life ’ , or the story of Shams al-Barudi 
in which the devil was expelled from her body, were striking examples confirming 
the image of a total rupture of a life ‘before and after . They did not mind being 
called repentant artists. They regretted their former activities and considered art 
haram and ‘of the devil ’ , or at least for women.
Other artists, like Yasmin al-Khiyyam and Hoda Sultan, strongly detested the 
concept of ‘repentance . Yasmin al-Khiyyam refused to cooperate with Nasif and 
Khodayr ’s second edition of their book. She was insulted by the title of the first 
edition of Repentant Artists and the Sex Stars. She forecast that they would enter 
‘hell ’ (Nasif and Khodyar 1993: 93). She did not consider her former career as a 
singer of mostly religious and national songs sinful. She quit because she became 
very much involved with the charity organisation of her late father, Sheikh al-Hosari 
(personal interview, 3 March 2005). Also, Hoda Sultan rejected the term repentance 
when she decided to act veiled (Al-Liwa ’ al 'Islamiyya, 6-5-2003). She was totally 
convinced of art and its potential to raise the awareness of people. She saw no reason 
to step down and not to use her god-given talent as an actress.
A third position among artists was taken by those who did not mind the concept 
‘toba’ , but used it in a more subtle and generalised way. They pointed at the habit of 
the prophet to repent 70 times a day. All people make mistakes and commit sins and
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it is lofty practice for anyone to repent. This did not necessarily mean that they 
considered art haram. They might dislike most art in its present form for its low, 
cheap and un-Islamic character but were convinced that art ‘can have a mission ’ . 
This line of thought became more prominent after the mid-1990s when several of 
them returned to the screen.
Artists (dis)like of the label repentance was thus directly connected to their views 
on art ’ s permissibility. Several of the stepped-down artists of the 1980s, such as Shams 
al-Barudi, Hana' Tharwat and Hala al-' Safi, strongly argued for its unlawful nature, 
particularly for women. Most artists who stepped down in the early 1990s were more 
ambivalent in their views or changed their ideas on art in the course of time. For 
instance, Soheir al-Babli did not deny art ’ s potential as a messenger. Several artists like 
'Afaf Sho'ib initially stated that art is haram but transformed their ideas within years 
to the conviction that art can have a purpose if it is done within an Islamic 
framework. After an initial stage of rather conservative views, they turned to a more 
moderate discourse on art and gender. 'Abir Sharqawi, who replaced Soheir al-Babli 
in the play her father directed, stepped down herself seven years later. During the 
interview in 2005, she told me that she was initially quite strict in her views due to 
the influence of preachers such as Dr. 'Omar 'Abd al-Kafi and the repentant artists 
who had turned into preachers. But after dissociating herself from the community of 
stepped-down artists and reading for herself, she came to a new understanding of art. 
During the late 1980s and early 1990s, though, a rather conservative discourse on art 
and gender dominated the community of stepped-down artists.
Conservative and Islamist preachers, such as Sheikh Mitwalli al-Sha'arawi and 
Dr. 'Omar 'Abd al-Kafi, were clearly influential in the artists ’ choices to leave art 
and veil. The Islamist press used their stories as a golden opportunity to defame art 
and promote their views on gender. Yet, stepped-down artists were seemingly not 
only passive pawns of the Islamist agenda. Shams al-Barudi was actively engaged in 
da'wah, mainly among her relatives and friends, including artists. Hana' Tharwat 
and Kamilia al-'Arabi turned into preachers, da'iyat, lecturing at houses for women 
of the middle and upper-middle class (Ruz al-Yusif, 1-3-1993). They were influential 
in the emergence of the phenomenon of the ‘Islamic salons ’ (Haenni 2002; van 
Nieuwkerk 2008). 'Afaf Sho'ib was proud of her da'wah activities. Yasmin al- 
Khiyyam turned into an influential personality through her position as the director of 
the charity organisation cum mosque al-Hosari. She gave the floor to new preachers, 
such as Dr. 'Omar 'Abd al-Kafi in the early 1990s, and later on to 'Amr Khaled. 
Several repentant artists entered da'wah institutes and preached in private; some of 
them were eventually able to return to the screen and host religious programs. They 
were mostly banned from the Egyptian TV channels and worked on foreign channels.
All of them strongly advocated and publicised the veil. Women s veiling was seen 
as of primary importance and the final step to iltizam, that is, to become observant 
pious Muslim women. Preachers like Sheikh al-Sha'arawi and Dr. 'Omar 'Abd 
al-Kafi made them aware that veiling is ‘ obligatory and a ‘ commandment from 
God ’ just like fasting and praying. They were not aware of its obligatory character 
and centrality for pious Muslims. Doing charity, praying, and fasting and going to 
Mecca were in their view the quintessential conditions for piety. Yet through these 
preachers they became aware that veiling was a condition just as important for pious 
womanhood as the uncontested pillars of Islam. Putting veiling on the same footing
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as the recognised pillars of Islam was according to its secular and moderate Muslim 
critics a clear indication of the Saudi-tisation of their Islam.
Whereas they all advocated the veil, not all stepped-down artists completely 
shared the preachers ’ ideals of womanhood and domesticity. The ex-performers/ 
preachers, such as Shams al-Barudi, Kamilia al-'Arabi and Hana' Tharwat, shared 
Sheikh al-Sha'arawi ’s and Dr. 'Omar 'Abd al-Kafi ’ s notions on gender and domesticity. 
Shams al-Barudi, for instance, considered motherhood a divine task that suits the female 
nature. Women are created to be mothers, not to be engineers or farmers. But if they 
fulfilled the tasks of motherhood adequately they are allowed to work within the 
confines of the religious commandments. Women should not work if this results in 
the neglect of children and only if it is a matter of sheer necessity. Those women who 
leave their children in a kindergarten are not acting according to Islam (van Nieuwkerk 
2008). Yet, the ex-performers themselves did not necessarily practise these ideals.
The pious ex-performers have remained important public figures. Several worked 
as preachers, or were engaged in Islamic charity, such as Kamilia al-'Arabi, Hana' 
Tharwat, Shams al-Barudi, and Yasmin al Khiyyam. Others started an Islamic 
business, such as fashion, video or cassette firms. Also, Islamic education and 
da'wah were new fields in which they had entered. Some eventually returned as 
veiled actresses or hostesses. Afaf Sho'ib initially lived off her mother ’ s inheritance 
but returned as a veiled actress. Farida Seif al-Nasr tried some commercial projects 
but failed and returned to art. She was one of the few who returned unveiled 
(Ruz al-Yusif, 2-8-1993). Most of them performed veiled and were influential in 
making veiling fashionable. Many returned out of conviction with the idea of 
producing clean cinema (al-sinima al-nadifa) or purposeful art (al-fann al-hadif), a 
trend which has become significant after the mid-1990s.7
The first group of stepped-down performers has remained active in public life 
through preaching in homes and mosques. The veiled actresses of the beginnings of 
the 1990s eventually returned to the screen and some of them have a religious program 
such as Shahira, Mona 'Abd al-Ghani and Miyar al-Bablawi. They all sought ways to 
combine an active public presence with piety and used their (mediatised) presence to 
publicise their ideas of pious womanhood. For all of them, it held true that they 
remained influential public figures and influenced the concepts of piety for women. 
They were working out new models for active pious womanhood in which they 
combined veiling with public influence and visibility/audibility.
Epilogue: ‘repentant’ artists and the public sphere
In this article, I have tried to analyse whether the debates about the repentant artists 
have lived up to scholars expectations about the role of new media in the emergent 
public sphere in the Middle East. The repentance of artists is an interesting case for
7 This trend of returning to art, fashionable veiling and the production of pious art is very interesting and 
needs more space than is allowed within the context of this paper. I am preparing a presentation on this 
issue: ‘New Religiosity and 'Fann al-Hadif ’ ‘Art with a Mission ’ in Egypt. ESF Exploratory Workshop 
‘Islamization of the cultural sphere? Critical perspectives on Islam and performing arts in Western Europe 
and the Middle East ’ , 23-24 October 2008, Amsterdam.
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analysing the public sphere in Egypt. First, this issue forms a delicate matter because 
the artists left the world of secular art for that of piety. For that reason, they have been 
tremendously important in starting the debate about Islam and art. Second, it is also 
a good example for analysing the use of media in the public sphere because these 
former performers are public figures with a high media profile. All parties involved 
realise the enormous influence of their repentance and veiling on millions. All 
voices extensively use the media in order to pull a massive public over to their side.
Habermas expected the religious to retreat from the public sphere into the private 
sphere in the West, an assumption criticised by Salvatore and Eickelmann (2004) for 
the Middle East. We have indeed seen that Islam is the dominant framework for 
discussing notions of the ‘ common good . The regime, Islamists, conservative 
Muslims, liberals and secularists all framed their ideas about art, gender and cultural 
authenticity in religious terms. Instead of retreating, it could be argued that the 
religious framework has extended its scope into the debates about such issues as art 
and culture, a sphere which is often considered the last stronghold of secularism. 
Religious notions entered the ‘cultural public sphere ’ in the sense that it framed the 
deliberations on art and culture. Whereas in the early 1990s the Islamist discourse 
was predominately against art, these discussions paved the way for new ideas which 
were to sprout after the mid-1990s. The ensuing discourses about proper Islamic art, 
‘pious art or ‘art with a mission evolved from the increasing enmeshment of 
Islamists within the ‘cultural public sphere ’ .
A second expectation is that the new media would give the opportunity for new 
voices to enter the debate and, more importantly, that these new voices could be 
regarded as a counterpublic. Within the authoritarian climate of Egypt, an implicit 
assumption is that these new counterpublics will be of a more democratic or anti­
authoritarian kind. We have seen that the new media is extensively used and that 
new members entered the public arena, in this case foremost the repentant artists. Yet 
as to the question of whether the oppositional voices form a counterpublic the answer 
is less clear. Several problems have appeared. First, in this extremely tense period in 
which terrorist attacks and a harsh knocking down of Islamist opposition by the regime 
flushed over the country, the formation of publics is a contested process itself. Second, 
the notion of a counterpublic is not easy to hold in the Egyptian context.
Repentant artists were merged with the ‘Islamists ’ , which in turn were amalgamated 
with the ‘extremists ’ in the campaign of secularists and the regime. Secularists, 
performing artists and the regime were combined as ‘the enemies of Islam in the 
Islamist press. The multiplicity of voices was dissolved into two competing blocs. While 
there appear to be two clear-cut parties involved in the discursive arena, this is 
misleading. The regime is not a monolithic agent and includes several fractions of 
Islamists as well. Secularists are dependent and entangled with the regime but the same 
holds true for several fractions of the Islamic revival movement. The stepped-down 
artists were crushed between the opposite voices but were also internally divided.
The whole idea of an independent oppositional counterpublic thus appears 
difficult to maintain in Egypt due to the encompassing character of the state. Yet this 
does not necessarily foreclose contestory movements and ideas. In that sense, 
Hirschkind ’s (2006) idea of counterpublic is interesting. He analyses the Islamic 
revivalist movement or da'wah movement as a counterpublic. He does not use the 
notion of Fraser (1990) in the sense that the counterpublic is autonomous and
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sovereign with respect to the state. In his study of the Islamic cassette media, 
Hirschkind shows that this Islamic soundscape combines ethical exercise, political 
debate and popular entertainment. It is a form of political contestation and 
cultivation of religious sensibilities and affect that creates a separate moral space. 
Building on Asad s insight that the public sphere is not an empty space but is 
constituted by the sensibilities of participants, he analyses the role of audition in 
crafting public sensibilities. He thus shifts the attention from Habermas ideas of 
political deliberation as a rational disembodied form of reasoning to the ethical 
values and religious sensibilities and affect for social and political life (idem: 30­
31). Hirschkind thus rather emphasises the different sensorium and moral 
dispositions underlying the discursive practices of the oppositional da'wah 
movement as forming an ethical counterworld rather than the independent character 
or content of their deliberations (Hirschkind 2006: 105-143).
Hirschkind particularly elaborates his arguments with regard to the aural— 
preaching or speaking and listening or audition—and concentrates on cassette 
sermons as the medium for contestation. This is contrasted with the visual scape and 
print. The repentant artists are mainly connected to TV and print, the media mostly 
used and controlled by the government. Some of them became presenters of 
religious programmes or TV da'iyat. Those who preached at private homes as 
da'iyat did not produce tapes as far as I know. Yet visibility and audibility are not 
always easily separated with regard to preaching. Also, the more general argument 
of situating contestation in the public sphere beyond rational disembodied forms of 
reasoning by autonomous groups or individuals is stimulating. This is accordingly an 
intriguing approach to follow up with regard to the pious art productions that were to 
emerge after the mid-1990s.
Finally, what about the ‘new ideas ’ of the repentant artists? As women, they were 
certainly new voices in the public deliberations on Islam and art, but how far did 
they express new ideas? They were not passive pawns of the Islamists agenda. They 
were willing partners for at least a part of the Islamists notions of the pious woman. 
Particularly with regard to the importance of veiling, the views of the veiled artists 
and Islamists collided. They actively used their public prominence to promote 
veiling among women. They have eventually helped to make veiling fashionable, a 
trend not yet very visible in the early 1990s. With regard to art and gender, a mixed 
picture emerged. Although in the early 1990s conservative views on art and gender 
prevailed, not all former performers shared this view. Even if they upheld ideas on the 
centrality of women s domesticity and the Muslim family they did not live up to this 
ideal in their personal lives. They remained important public personalities, as preachers, 
business women in Islamic businesses or in charity. With regard to art, there was an 
ambivalence too: they did not all distance themselves from their art productions and 
several of them eventually returned. They have thus been influential in setting off the 
debate on Islam and art and eventually in the creation of new forms of pious art. They 
have thus been important in the emergence of a pious cultural sphere. Yet this 
materialised only after the mid-1990s when the climate in Egypt became less tense.
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